Containing China - The Historical Analogy with Japan

The following commentary comes from William D. O'Neil via H-War:

The irony of the hand-wringing over "containment" of China is that we've been here before, only no one seems to be able to remember.

As early as the 1890s, widespread alarm was evident in the United States over the specter of Japanese expansionism. This was a mixture of raw ethnocentrism and cold strategic calculation. At the same time, being the kind of country it was (and largely remains) there was no great unity in American views, and many unhesitatingly supported Japan's economic and political ambitions.

Both the Roosevelt (TR) and Wilson Administrations pursued policies of appeasement, while simultaneously building up the navy. The real departure point was the Twenty-One Demands affair of 1915. In the early 1920s the political elites in both countries attempted to build a basis for cooperative relationships, but the rise of very strongly ethnocentric groups in both nations undercut these efforts. Nevertheless, Japan and the United States managed to maintain reasonably productive relationships at many levels during the 1920s, notwithstanding some rather nasty clashes in China, and the ill-will generated by the laws excluding Japanese from American life.

Unfortunately for Japan, the military services fell under the leadership of extremely ethnocentric officers, and the Great Depression undermined those who wanted to advance Japan by economic means. The military came to power, teamed with neoconservative civilians. Japan was in a cycle in which the ethnocentrists would precipitate some expansionist action they saw as essential to national security, the west would respond negatively (even if only symbolically so), and this would evoke fears of "encirclement" (i.e., containment) leading to further expansionism to break out of the "iron ring." Thus even though the anti-Japanese ethnocentrist elements in the west did not hold particularly strong political positions in the 1930s, a self-amplifying positive feedback loop was established and maintained.

Eventually it was the external forcing function of Nazi aggressive expansionism at the other end of Eurasia that tipped Japan into war with the west. It is very possible that matters would never have reached such a pass absent the predominately exogenous shocks of the Great Depression and European War. At the same time, these shocks need not have been fatal had the ethnocentric elements not gained such dominance over Japan.

Despite many changes, the overall sociopolitical constitution of the United States remains much as it has nearly always been. There are both ethnocentric and cosmopolitan elements and neither is likely to be able to establish long-term dominance in the control of the nation's affairs. The United States will thus continue to act somewhat erratically within bounds determined by a broad consensus on basic economic and strategic interests -- which do not in themselves dictate any fundamental conflict with China.

The Chinese system, with its narrow leadership base and lack of regular mechanisms for turnover of power, gives an illusion of a steady hand on policy. But it is even more vulnerable to ethnocentric capture than its Japanese counterpart of the 1920s. Even if this takes place, even if it occurring right now, it need not have effects as terrible as those of World War II, but it would run a very uncomfortably great danger of doing so. The seeming prospect that China is contemplating its own replay of the Tsinan (Jinan) Incident over the Senkakus is anything but reassuring.

Some have objected that no military conflict could eventuate because of the threat of nuclear weapons, but these are not the words of anyone who knows or reflects on history. Ever since humankind has been fighting wars, for at least 100,000 years and very probably longer, unlimited conflicts have always threatened and frequently enough resulted in the destruction of both of the combatant societies. History says very clearly that such a threat may dampen the risks of war but cannot eliminate them. Indeed, the very fact that it is apologists for China (which by any rational calculation would inevitably suffer far more severely in any nuclear exchange) who invariably raise the nuclear specter speaks eloquently of the limited (albeit very great) power of the threat of annihilation.

Politics & Music in Pakistan

Several years after "Yeh Hum Naheen," a bold attempt by Pakistani musicians to oppose terrorism (see below), the country's musical community seems to be losing hope, the AFP reports.

New Definitions for Information Operations

Ever since I began studying information operations (IO) five years ago, I have been frustrated with the definitions. Too many are bureaucratic non-definitions, often circular in nature. "The Office of Special Studies conducts studies that are special." What is 'special'? "Special refers to studies, particularly those carried out by the Office of Special Studies." You get the idea.

Perhaps most frustrating is the fact that the five "core capabilities" of Information Operations overlap terribly. Nor are they all really capabilities. Electronic warfare (EW) pertains to the physical waves of radios, radar, etc; it is a medium (or, to be more specific, operations in a given medium). Likewise, computer network operations (CNO) pertains to a medium. But military deception (MILDEC) and operational security (OPSEC) are both activities , which can be carried out in a varied of media. Psychological operations (PSYOP) are defined as operations by the military to convey information to a foreign audience to influence it. Again, that is an activity, and arguably one that encompasses MILDEC. Thus, if one hacks into an enemy computer to plant bogus information which will deceive him, one is engaging in CNO, MILDEC and PSYOP all at once.

It may be time to return to the drawing board. What, at the most fundamental level, is IO? Let me propose that its primary realm is the mind of the enemy. This makes it distinct from intelligence which, most fundamentally, pertains to our own mind and what we know (and adding to that body of knowledge).

There are really only two things we can do to the enemy's mind: we can convey information to it, or we can withhold information from it. We may be trying to make him feel fearful, over-confident or ignorant; we may be trying to make him attack the wrong location or hold back from attacking all together. But IO contains only two fundamental activities for accomplishing all those missions and more: we can convey information or withhold it.

Withholding information is conceptually simpler, so we will deal with it first. There are two basic means of withholding information: (1) preventing the enemy's eyes and ears from collecting it and (2) preventing its effective communication to headquarters.

Preventing collection can be either passive or active. Passive collection prevention means employing security, that is, metaphorically (or sometimes literally) building fences. Security includes computer firewalls (part of computer network defense, or CND), background checks, ID cards and a host of other measures designed to prevent the enemy from getting close to information he might like to obtain. Active collection prevention involves targeting enemy attempts to collect information. This can include physical destruction of enemy satellites or reconnaissance craft, but it can also include the capture or turning of enemy agents, which is the realm of counterintelligence (CI). CI often makes use of knowledge about the enemy - intelligence - to improve its collection prevention capabilities; if you know the enemy spy is coming, it is much easier to arrest him.

Preventing enemy communication can take a variety of forms: physical destruction of communications infrastructure, jamming of enemy signals (EW), or destroying enemy computer networks with viruses (a form of computer network attack - CNA).

While there are many forms of withholding information, this activity is relatively straight-forward. More complex is conveying information to the enemy. One of the reasons for this is that while the enemy's ignorance is almost always an obvious good for us, his possession of information - be it true or false - requires a more complex plan. Moreover, IO can also target third parties that are not necessarily enemies, including neutral nations or populations under enemy governments.

There are two ways of dividing means by which information is conveyed to the enemy. The first schema for thinking about this involves the true/false/partly true division. (This should not be confused with white, black and grey propaganda, terms which refer to the stated source of propaganda, rather than its contents.) Any body involved in conveying information may convey truthful messages; on the other hand, certain organizations - such as the Peace Corps and Voice of America - do not knowingly convey falsehood, since doing so would undermine their basic mission. While outright deception certainly has its utility, half-truths are often more useful, and must always be used to support deception.

The other method of dividing means of information conveyance is by medium. To some extent these media correspond to the IO "core capabilities".  Electromagnetic waves are clearly the realm of EW, while the bits and bytes of computer information belong to CNO.  Physical observation of troop movements may be prevented by OPSEC, or exploited by MILDEC.  Words and images (carried via leaflets or broadcasts) may be conveyed by PSYOP as well as non-IO entities.  Although such functions as White House press conferences are not primarily concerned with IO,  they should be planned in coordination with a larger IO strategy to ensure consistency.

At the very top of this hierarchy of definitions lies a question about which we have said relatively little: What do we want the enemy to do? That is why IO tries to get inside the enemy's head in the first place. The answer to that question will vary from one situation to the next, but it is the essential question. Closely related to it is a second: What do we want the enemy to think? The answer to the first question may be that we want the enemy to attack a position which he cannot take, suffering major losses in the process. If that is what we want him to do, we will try to accomplish that end by making him think that our position is weaker than it is. Around this we build an IO strategy, both denying and conveying information. We capture his spies and jam his radar so he cannot see the true strength of our position. We also release some true information about the presence of certain commanders elsewhere, suggesting that the units they command are not located at the position in question. Moreover, we also convey false information, suggesting that our forces are thin, perhaps because we believe the enemy will attack elsewhere.

These various categories and definitions are not perfect. Counterintelligence, for example, can gain useful information from turned enemy agents, and thus belongs to the field of intelligence as well as IO. Furthermore, CI can be used both to deny the enemy information as well as to convey information to him.

In spite of this and other shortcomings, I think this schema has much to offer. It provides a logical hierarchy of functions which allow for clear understanding of inter-locking roles. A tactical PSYOP unit may drop leaflets or conduct shows of military force, but both are methods of conveying information to the enemy, and both require some understanding of how the enemy processes information in order to craft effective messages. An emphasis on what IO does and how it does it, rather than how the Pentagon divides it into boxes, may allow for more flexible operations in the field and better outcomes for our IO commanders.


Pictured is an EC-130 Commondo Solo aircraft of the 193rd Special Operations Wing, used for propaganda broadcasts.  Picture via FlightSchoolList.com.

CAPTURED!

Read more here.

US-Indian Relations in the Post-bin Laden World

This morning's FT reports that Osama bin Laden's neighbors in Abbottabad knew his house contained highly conservative residents, among them both Afghan refugees and Arabic-speakers. Moreover, locals knew that the house's residents bought food in large quantities at a time, had a taste for foreign beverages, burned all their trash and refused to allow their servants to hold second jobs with other employers. How did this not raise red flags? One neighbor, Jehangir Khan, reports that security in the area is heavy: “People are frequently asked to produce their national identity cards.” The case that Pakistan's intelligence is incompetent or complicit grows ever stronger.

Meanwhile, the discovery of Osama bin Laden deep in Pakistan, far from the Afghan border, is likely not only to sour US-Pakistani relations, but also - by extension - to strengthen US-Indian relations. Relations between the world's two largest democracies, though sometimes rocky (as in the case of India's recent rejection of US fighter planes), have general been positive in themselves; complications have primarily arisen from US support to Pakistan. If (or when) that support tapers off, US relations with India will likely continue to improve.

So where might we expect, or hope, for future US-Indian cooperation? Four areas come to mind:

• Anti-piracy operations. We have already seen the Indian Navy take strong actions against Somali pirates. Likewise, the Indian Navy is already active in the Strait of Malacca. The US takes keen interest in the freedom of the seas, particularly in these two regions. Look for growing collaboration between US and Indian forces here.


• Burma. The US has long tried to isolate the Burmese military junta, but a shift in US strategy and signs of possible change in the regime mean we can expect greater engagement in the future. India, by virtue of its border with Burma, has historically taken a more pragmatic approach to the Burmese junta. As American and Indian views converge, expect greater diplomatic and development cooperation.


• Terrorism. India's single greatest terrorist enemy is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), whose primary aim is to drive India out of Kashmir. While the US is more interested in al-Qaeda, particularly Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), LeT is connected to the international network of Islamic terrorists, and thus the US and India have a common interest in fighting these forces. That Pakistan's ISI has often been a link in this chain complicates US-Indian cooperation, but if American ties to Pakistan decline, the door is opened for greater counterterrorism coordination.


• Africa. India has strong ties to Africa, particularly with such important nations as Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Given its historic participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, India enjoys a degree of trust on the African continent which is rarely afforded to the United States. India will be careful to safeguard that status, but the US would do well to support Indian efforts, as a means of aiding African development and as a counterweight to Chinese penetration of Africa. The US presence in UN peacekeeping operations is currently all but non-existent. With the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, however, expect US involvement in peacekeeping to rise somewhat in the coming years. Much of this will be in Africa, where India already participates in peacekeeping missions in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire.

Leave Out the "China"

Those who have been following the news, not only in the last few weeks but for the last few years, know that Beijing has been doing a considerable amount of saber rattling at sea. In fact, China claims the entire South China Sea as sovereign territory. Well, I say we launch a simple campaign to resist Chinese encroachment on the international waters off her coast. Instead of calling them the "East China Sea" and the "South China Sea", why not simply the "East Sea" and "South Sea"? They don't belong to China, so why should we pretend they do? (Admittedly, there will be some confusion with the southern half of the Pacific Ocean, once known as the South Sea or Seas. But that's a bit of an archaic usage, so I think we can manage.)

Turkey's New Role in the World

An excellent article in today's FT raises a question which has been on the minds of many analysts of international affairs: Turkey's evolving role on the global stage.

The basic conundrum is this: is Turkey's growing confidence and departure from the American playbook a good thing or a bad thing? I submit that, by and large, it is a good thing.

I am indebted to George Kennan for pointing out that the US does not need to conquer the world; we simply need to prevent the bad guys from doing so. Thus, he argued that multiple centers of power were perfectly acceptable, so long as no more than one was Soviet. Indeed, encouraging other centers of power could be a good thing, diluting the Soviet share of the total.

Today the Soviets are no longer with us, thankfully, but threats remain from China, Russia and Islamist terrorism. Turkey can serve as a rival to all three. Thus, while I would like to see Turkey maintain good relations with the US, Greece and Israel, I welcome Turkish involvement in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucus region and Central Asia as well. There will be times Turkey departs from stated American policies; there will be times we step on each other's toes. But we should weigh these costs against the benefits that Turkey brings. How else, for example, could we end up with a secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference coming from a NATO member?

Afghanistan: 1946

If you'd like to take a trip down memory lane, check out this pamphlet put out by the State Department in 1946. Much has changed, of course, but much has not, like the comment from the first page that "transportation to and from this landlocked country has always been slow and difficult."

The Security-Development Nexus

The new issue of Security Dialogue, a journal which "seeks to combine contemporary theoretical analysis with challenges to public policy across a wide ranging field of security studies" is now available online:


Special Issue on the Security-Development Nexus Revisited:
1 February 2010; Vol. 41, No. 1

Mapping the Security—Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, Cacophony, Convergence?
Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal

Development and Security: Origins and Future
Björn Hettne

The Liberal Way of Development and the Development—Security Impasse: Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide
Mark Duffield

The Security and Development Nexus in Cape Town: War on Gangs, Counterinsurgency and Citizenship
Steffen Jensen

The Bullet in the Living Room: Linking Security and Development in a Colombo Neighbourhood
Camilla Orjuela

Strategic Communication & Smarter Interrogation

I recently came across two interesting bits of national security information on the internet. The first was this interesting website on strategic communication. “Now what,” you rightly ask, “is that?” Well, one of the many useful things the website provides is definitions. In the case of this particular term, it refers to:

“The synchronized coordination of statecraft, public affairs, public diplomacy, military information operations, and other activities... to advance US foreign policy objectives.”

In other words, strategic communication involves making sure that your messages to foreign governments and populations are clear and consistent. All too often, American administrations from either party will forget about key components of strategic communication, or the whole thing. Messages from different governmental entities are frequently contradictory. Often they focus on traditional state-to-state diplomacy, to the neglect of public diplomacy. And they usually ignore the propaganda value of our deeds.

The Strategic Communication website is still a work in progress, and looks raggedy in sections, but there are a lot of good resources already, and I expect more to come.

The second thing I came across was this book, How to Break a Terrorist: The US Interrogators Who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the Deadliest Man in Iraq by Matthew Alexander. I have not read it yet, but I am intrigued by the title and the reviews I have seen. Cruel and inhuman practices have caused many people to turn up their noses at the term "interrogation" - and rightfully so. But Alexander reminds us that torture is not the only means of obtaining information from captives. Indeed, smarter techniques not only avoid brutalizing the subject, but are also more likely to produce quality information. That is a lesson often lost in the polemics about interrogation.

On the Failure of Population Schemes

This blog usually discusses matters of security, but statecraft has other aspects as well. An article which caught my attention this morning underlined that point: "Shanghai calls on chosen couples to exceed China's one child limit".

The gist of the article is quite simple: China has too many old people and not enough young people, which will make taking care of the elderly a nightmare. "Shanghai is taking the dramatic step of actively encouraging residents to exceed China's famed 'one child' limit, citing concerns about the aging of its population and a potentially shrinking workforce," the Financial Times writes.

The only thing that prevents me from saying, "I told you so," is the fact that I wasn't around when the "one child" policy was first put in place in 1979. The problems that China is now or soon will be facing are the obvious consequences of their actions. "Shanghai's initiative follows campaigns to encourage more child bearing in other crowded Asian cities such as Hong Kong and Singapore, which had previously worked to promote small families only to see birth rates trail off..." Well, yes, contraception and abortion campaigns tend to have that effect.

In addition to creating a demographic and economic disaster, "China's decades-old one-child policy... remains a significant intrusion into private life." An added bonus.

What particularly tickles me about this story is that plenty of people pointed out the fact that these kinds of policies will backfire. In 1968 Pope Paul VI issued his highly controversial encyclical Humanae vitae, which articulated the argument that contraception runs contrary to the natural order. If that sounds a bit too philosophic for a statesman to worry about, let me point out that the true statesman must understand the order of nature before he can operate effectively within it. It is a basic test the Chinese leadership have failed.

Remembering the July 20 Plot - Again

Two years ago I wrote a post about the July 20 plot. This year, commemorating those who attempted to overthrow Hitler in 1944 is even more important to me.

This past semester, as part of my duties as a teaching assistant at Texas A&M, I led discussions on John Weiss' The Ideology of Death: Why the Holocaust Happened in Germany. Weiss' argument is easily caricatured: conservatives, traditionalists, big business and Christianity (in particular Catholicism) were responsible for the Holocaust. Only progressive, atheistic (or at least irreligious and relativistic) socialists are free of blame in Weiss' account.

The problems with The Ideology of Death are legion, too many to mention here. I shall concern myself with only one: Weiss all but ignores Colonel Claus von Stauffenberg (pictured left) and the July 20 conspirators. Why? Because Stauffenberg represents everything Weiss abhors: a Catholic, an aristocrat, a nationalist and a military officer.

Weiss dismisses the July 20 plotters as johnny-come-latelys. The socialists, he says, had been opposing Hitler from day one, whereas the army only turned against Hitler when it was apparent that defeat was in store. Besides the fact that authors such as Allen Dulles have shown that the army had grave misgivings about Hitler and his band of unprofessional thugs even before the war began, Weiss overlooks a key point: the socialists never came close to toppling Hitler. The July 20 conspirators did.

As if to add insult to injury, Weiss claims that Stauffenberg has been shunned by a nation of proto-fascist Nazi sympathizers in the modern Federal Republic of Germany. His case is weak, at best. Stauffenberg's son Berthold became a general in the post-war German army; another son, Franz-Ludwig, became an elected member of both the German and European parliaments. The members of Germany's elite Wachbataillon take their oath of service on July 20, at the Bendlerblock, where the July 20 conspirators met and were later executed. The street on which it sits has been renamed Stauffenbergstraße and the building now houses the Memorial to the German Resistance.

The modern German army, created in 1955, is keen to sever any connections with its Nazi predecessors. Thus, in addition to post-1955 innovations, there are only two legitimate sources of tradition in the Germany army. One source is the military reformers of the 19th century, men like Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Clausewitz. The other source are the lives and heroic deaths of the July 20 conspirators.

Stauffenberg and his coconspirators were not the only people within Germany to oppose Hitler; brave men and women such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the White Rose movement did likewise. We would do well to reflect on their sacrifices and defend their legacy against the likes of John Weiss.



This post first appeared on The Guild Review, a blog of art, culture, faith and politics.

Difficult Choices in an Era of Deficits: The British Military Budget

My beloved Financial Times carries four pieces on its daily Comment page. Always. In all the years I have subscribed I do not recall ever seeing it otherwise.

So when I saw this morning that there were only three, with Max Hastings' column"What Britain Must Give Up for the Soldiers It Needs," taking up almost double the usual space, I sat up and took notice. The piece is indeed sobering.

I have argued before in favor of retaining conventional military power, including air power. However, Hastings makes a compelling case that Britain's current attempts to maintain military power in all sectors - including a nuclear deterrent and first-rate air intercepting capabilities - come at the cost of failure and death in places like Helmand. In an era of staggering government deficits, expensive projects mean fewer boots on the ground. Rather than simply recapping Hastings' entire article, let me simply suggest that you read it.

While Britain's needs are somewhat different than America's, and her budgets considerably smaller, the basic issues at stake are the same for all the Atlanticist powers. (I have not heard much about the French military budget lately, but I suspect similar debates are at hand, or soon will be.) Thus, Americans would do well to take note of the cousins' concerns.

There are two footnotes I would add to Hastings' comments : While the details of current projects mean that reconfiguring carriers from a fighter complement designed for interception to a helicopter complement designed for ground support may be expensive, it seems to me there are possibilities here for dual-use platforms which may help bridge some of the gap between traditional peer competition and small wars capabilities.

My second comment is related. Hastings makes a strong case that the Trident capability, however desirable in its own right, is expensive and less necessary than other programs. Likewise the F-35. But carriers are another matter. They are useful for power projection around the globe, a veritable sine qua non of international engagement of the kind Britain would like to maintain. And whereas Trident missiles are only good for intimidating second-tier state powers, carriers are versatile - or at least can be - and thus capable of supporting both traditional and asymmetric uses of military power.

The Irrelevance of Political Science

In a piece he wrote back in April, FT columnist Gideon Rachman wrote that "it is no longer fashionable to pick political scientists for the top positions making US foreign policy." The reason why is clear enough: "I looked at something called the Journal of Conflict Resolution and found articles about real-world political problems which seemed just to be a mass of quadratic equations. It is hard to believe that anybody actually trying to resolve a conflict would find this kind of stuff useful, or relevant." Joe Nye and Stephen Walt, both of whom teach at Harvard, have made similar observations.

As a result of the growing irrelevance of political science, it has become fashionable to recruit talent from Washington's think-tanks, institutions which are much more policy-oriented than the American academy. But this, Rachman points out, has in turn created another problem: "The transition must be extraordinary for these former analysts and scribblers. Many of them have never managed anything more than a research assistant. And suddenly, they are placed in the White House or the Pentagon and given real-world responsibilities and real soldiers to play with. It’s all a long way from the seminar room."

But a little school in the Federal City seeks to address some of these issues. The Institute of World Politics was founded in 1990 by a former member of the National Security Council Staff who noticed the very same problem Rachman points out: in spite of studying and teaching at the finest schools in the national security field, John Lenczowski discovered that these institutions had not prepared him for the actual work of national security. So he founded his own school, dedicated to the apprehension of intellectual tools which have a practical value for foreign policy practitioners. For faculty he has recruited a variety of men and women who are not only published scholars in their respective fields, but have also served in foreign policy and can bring real-life experience to bear on their teaching. Finally, recognizing that international affairs is not an amoral business, IWP insists that its students study the ideals and values of the American Founding and the Western moral tradition.

IWP has not yet achieved a perfect synthesis of study and practice, ideal and realpolitik. But it is definitely doing some interesting work and making a serious effort to train a rising generation of foreign policy practitioners in, well, the practice of foreign policy.

Anti-Western League Holds Maneuvers

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an organization for military cooperation which includes Russia, China and all the former Soviet republics in Central Asia except Turkmenistan, are currently holding military exercises in Tajikistan, the BBC reports. The exercises are being billed as an "anti-terrorism" drill, but given that pro-democratic or otherwise anti-establishment movements in these countries are often labeled "terrorists" the claim is dubious. Moreover, the exercise will include not only personnel and vehicles, but also fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. And it is taking place in a country that borders Afghanistan, where NATO is current waging a war against the Taliban. In spite of recent diplomatic niceties, the message is clear: America, go home. This is someone else's back yard.

Observers from India, Pakistan and Iran - all of which have official observer status with the organization - were present. Mongolia, a staunch supporter of the US, also has official observer status, but for reasons that are not given, there are no Mongolian observers present.

"One of the exercises involves Russian and Tajik special forces countering a simulated terrorist attack from Afghanistan." Another exercise involved para-drops. This is no small-scale war game. Nevertheless, do you think Dmitry Medvedev is going to suddenly decide to drop his complaint about NATO exercises in Georgia? Of course not.


The photo is from Peace Mission 2007, the previous SCO war game. According to official Chinese sources, "air forces and precision-guided weapons" were used at this "anti-terrorism military drill." Mmm hmm...

An Ancient Approach to Political Warfare - Part II

Continued from Part I.

Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, contends that “since the objective of rhetoric is judgment… we must have regard not only to the speech’s being demonstrative and persuasive, but also to… bringing the giver of judgment [i.e. the audience] into a certain condition” (2.1). This requires an understanding of the audience and the sorts of things to which they are attentive; thus, Aristotle spends all of Section 7 discussing the possible characters of men who may hear a speech. The rhetors of the Old Testament understood that their audience valued history and historical continuity; thus, they made a point of framing their message in these terms, often invoking the prophecies of old.

This approach to appropriating tradition for propagandistic purposes was not unique to the Greeks or Hebrews, but can be found all over the ancient world. Philip M. Taylor contends that “Rome lacked the rich mythological sources available to Greek propagandists, so it created a mythology of its own” (35) This is, in fact, a sloppy simplification of a far more interesting process: Virgil’s Aeneid did not so much create a mythology as weave together several pre-existing stories of Rome’s founding – one by Aeneas and the Trojan survivors, another by the twins Romulus and Remus – in a way that supported the imperial government. Put another way, he appropriated a tradition, drawing upon its elements and then going beyond it to cover new ground.

Kautilya, an ancient Indian thinker, was a contemporary of Aristotle’s, though 3,000 miles away. He too understood the importance of appropriating tradition and discussed it in his Arthashastra, a handbook of statecraft. He explains that a king who has recently conquered new territory should “adopt the way of life, dress, language and customs of the people, show the same devotion to the gods of the territory [as to his own gods] and participate in the people’s festivals” (13.5.8; Rangarajan’s 741). Note that Kautilya is not interested in any particular quality of local customs, except that they are local and most likely beloved by the people. Though it is highly unlikely that Kautilya ever heard of Aristotle or his work, both demonstrated the same finesse for understanding an audience and the things that will favorably dispose it.

Modern-day practitioners of propaganda and political warfare would do well to learn from the ancients this lesson of appropriation. Americans, in particular, living in a relatively young nation that is more oriented toward the future than the past, tend to undertake their efforts without first asking themselves if there is already a pre-existing tradition whose terms and concepts they might adopt in order to lend their arguments new credibility. This, of course, requires the effort of first learning about foreign traditions and schools of thought, but the price is well worth it.

One of the uncomfortable qualities of Mason’s work is that it raises a difficult problem: what are we to make of an Old Testament that often bears a striking resemblance to propaganda, but which is claimed to in fact be the Word of God? An understanding of the appropriation of tradition helps us resolve some of this dilemma. A God Who acts in human history, Who stoops to make Himself known to mankind, can be expected to reveal Himself in a way that is conducive to the human mind. This is not so much God acting like a man, as it is God speaking to men; the Divine Rhetor understands His audience quite well and tailors His message accordingly. The point may be illustrated in regards to the earlier example of the lands promised to Abraham. God, in drawing a spiritual parallel between Abraham and Solomon, also draws a geographic one, not because the geography is or is not historically correct, but because the human mind appreciates and naturally grasps this sort of physical parallelism. Aristotle and Kautilya would understand the technique; there is no reason we should not.


This post first appeared on The Guild Review earlier this month.

An Ancient Approach to Political Warfare - Part I

In his work Propaganda and Subversion in the Old Testament, Rex Mason makes regular reference to ‘prophecies after the event,’ (vaticinia ex eventu). Mason’s reading of these accounts is rather straightforward: such prophecies were written after the events they predicted and function as legitimizing propaganda, either for a status quo power or for forces of change.* While this may be the case with some prophecies, particularly those whose level of detail cannot otherwise be explained (at least by human factors), there are a variety of other prophetic occasions which allow for a far more nuanced understanding of political warfare as waged in the Old Testament. The appropriation of a pre-existing tradition, rather than the creation of one out of whole cloth, not only provides valuable insights for modern-day political warfare practitioners, but also begins to resolve some of the tension between the human and divine elements of the Old Testament narrative.

In Genesis 15, Abraham is promised the “land from the river of Egypt as far as the great river Euphrates,” including the land of the “Kenites, Kenizzites, Kadmonites, Hittites, Perizzites, Rephaim, Amorites and Canaanites.” Mason points out that “these are the very borders ascribed to Solomon’s rule at the height of his fortunes: ‘Solomon exercised rule over all the kingdoms from the River [i.e. the Euphrates], to the land of the Philistines, that is, as far as the border of Egypt’” (33-4; internal quotation from 1 Kings 4:21). Mason comments that “the parallel between the ideal boundary claimed in royal propaganda for Solomon and the extent of land promised to Abraham in the ‘prophecy’ cannot be coincidental,” and concludes that “the stories of Abraham have an element of royal ideology in them” (34). However, an alternative reading of this parallelism is plausible.

It is quite possible that the story of the land promised to Abraham predated the Davidic monarchy; even if some editing has occurred between the Davidic-era version and the one that has come down to us, the essential details – including the borders of the lands promised to Abraham – may have already been set down. In such a case, Solomon would not have created the account of earlier events to match his kingdom, but shaped the perception of his kingdom to imply continuity with the past. Without realizing, Mason himself seems to have considered this possibility when he notes that the boundaries claimed by Solomon were “very largely fancy, for Solomon’s ‘empire’ (if such it may be called) certainly did not extend as far nor did he receive tribute from as many nations,” as named in the Abrahamic prophecy (34).**

A host of similar cases can be found in Mason’s work. He contends, for example, that the accounts of the Israelite tabernacle are “clearly influenced by the later Jerusalem temple,” in an attempt by priestly editors to write the central role of the temple into earlier history (57). While this interpretation is possible, Mason’s chronological gymnastics are hardly necessary to understand the parallelism between the tabernacle and the temple. Just as likely, priestly or royal personnel involved in the construction of the temple reached into Israelite history and consciously drew upon the example of the tabernacle, in order to imply continuity with the past, even if the temple in fact marked a shift in Israelite spirituality, as Mason argues.

Coming soon: Part II.


* I employ the term ‘propaganda’ throughout in the same way Mason does, to indicate ‘the presentation of material so as to express a particular belief or set of beliefs in such a way as to command assent to it from those to whom it is addressed’ (170). Thus, ‘propaganda’ is a neutral term referring to a method, not to the truth or falsehood, justice or injustice of the cause being promoted.

** To be fair, Mason does not explicitly advocate the position that these prophecies were completely fabricated after the fact; rather, he leaves the issue of their original material largely untouched, and appears not to have thought about this question in a systematic way. Thus, we find him at one point claiming that “the priests were creating a social order” (63) and then turning around and writing that the priests “skillfully preserved continuity with what had gone before” (64, emphasis added).

This post first appeared on The Guild Review earlier this month.

Clear Political Messages - For Once

America frequently has a problem getting its message out. We do a better job with domestic audiences than foreign ones, but even domestic messaging can be confused and ineffective. As a conservative, it has been painful for me to watch the McCain campaign's halting attempts to clearly articulate themes that resonate with the American people and with the Republican party's values. But one group, NeverFindOut.org, has managed to put together a series of ads that are clear, simple, and to the point, with a young and professional look. Whether you support John McCain or not, I encourage you to take a look; anyone interested in political rhetoric could take a page from their book.


"Part of the Problem"


"Middle Class"

Russia Launches Cyber War To Match Conventional Offensive

While Russian regular forces are engaging Georgian troops inside of Georgian territory, Russian cyberwarriors are busy doing their part to fight the tiny republic. As of this posting the Georgian president's website and the Georgian government homepage were down. Coincidence? Perhaps. But the proof comes when you visit the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, where visitors are met by this montage comparing Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to Adolph Hitler.

I'll give the Russians this: they're good at what they do...

(I've included above the links to all three websites so you can monitor developments in real time. I'd not be surprised to see Russian hackers add new content in the coming hours and days.)

Air Surperiority: Yesterday's Problem, or Tomorrow's?

John Gapper of the Financial Times has written an excellent piece on the F-22, the question of air superiority and the economics of the procurement process:

America’s air force misses the target

By John Gapper

Say what you like about the F-22, the world’s most advanced and expensive fighter jet, it is obviously fun to fly. One of these $350m aircraft dipped and fluttered around the sky above the Farnborough air show this week in a bravura show of agility.

The F-22 is a supersonic stealth aircraft dreamt up at the end of the cold war to impose American air superiority over Soviet fighters. In recent exercises, its invisibility and advanced radar and avionics allowed it to shoot down 80 aircraft for every time that it was hit itself.

The F-22’s party trick is to be able to pivot horizontally in mid-air as it sniffs around for a target. “The sensation is not: ‘Oh, my gosh, the nose is slipping out of control. It is ‘Oh, my gosh, I can get the nose to do what I want,’ ” said Al Norman, the F-22’s senior test pilot.

What impresses the US air force, however, is not what pleases the US government. The F-22 has become a symbol of what Robert Gates, the defence secretary, has dubbed “ ‘next-war-itis’ – the propensity of much of the defence establishment to be in favour of what might be needed in a future conflict”.

Mr Gates wants the US military instead to focus on the “war on terror” and asymmetric conflicts in which it has to work with allies to combat suicide bombers and insurgents in hot, dusty countries. The kind of air support that such campaigns require is helicopters and cargo aircraft, not a 21st-century stealth fighter jet.

As a result, he has stood firm against the USAF’s wish to have 381 F-22s to replace its ageing fleet of F-15s, a Vietnam-era fighter that has been repeatedly patched and upgraded. The US will buy only 183 and intends to make do instead with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a forthcoming stealth aircraft that is cheaper and more versatile.

Mr Gates may be right that the F-22 will prove an unnecessary precaution in the world as we know it and that five squadrons is “a reasonable buy”. But there are two difficulties with his obstinate position, one military and the second financial.

The military problem is that air superiority is something the US takes for granted but is not inevitable. Mr Gates clearly believes the USAF is stuck in the past but he could equally be accused of being stuck in the present. While terrorism is the immediate threat, China’s military rise and Russia’s military resurgence are worries for the future.

Click here for the rest of the article.