Monday, December 24, 2012

Containing China - The Historical Analogy with Japan

The following commentary comes from William D. O'Neil via H-War:

The irony of the hand-wringing over "containment" of China is that we've been here before, only no one seems to be able to remember.

As early as the 1890s, widespread alarm was evident in the United States over the specter of Japanese expansionism. This was a mixture of raw ethnocentrism and cold strategic calculation. At the same time, being the kind of country it was (and largely remains) there was no great unity in American views, and many unhesitatingly supported Japan's economic and political ambitions.

Both the Roosevelt (TR) and Wilson Administrations pursued policies of appeasement, while simultaneously building up the navy. The real departure point was the Twenty-One Demands affair of 1915. In the early 1920s the political elites in both countries attempted to build a basis for cooperative relationships, but the rise of very strongly ethnocentric groups in both nations undercut these efforts. Nevertheless, Japan and the United States managed to maintain reasonably productive relationships at many levels during the 1920s, notwithstanding some rather nasty clashes in China, and the ill-will generated by the laws excluding Japanese from American life.

Unfortunately for Japan, the military services fell under the leadership of extremely ethnocentric officers, and the Great Depression undermined those who wanted to advance Japan by economic means. The military came to power, teamed with neoconservative civilians. Japan was in a cycle in which the ethnocentrists would precipitate some expansionist action they saw as essential to national security, the west would respond negatively (even if only symbolically so), and this would evoke fears of "encirclement" (i.e., containment) leading to further expansionism to break out of the "iron ring." Thus even though the anti-Japanese ethnocentrist elements in the west did not hold particularly strong political positions in the 1930s, a self-amplifying positive feedback loop was established and maintained.

Eventually it was the external forcing function of Nazi aggressive expansionism at the other end of Eurasia that tipped Japan into war with the west. It is very possible that matters would never have reached such a pass absent the predominately exogenous shocks of the Great Depression and European War. At the same time, these shocks need not have been fatal had the ethnocentric elements not gained such dominance over Japan.

Despite many changes, the overall sociopolitical constitution of the United States remains much as it has nearly always been. There are both ethnocentric and cosmopolitan elements and neither is likely to be able to establish long-term dominance in the control of the nation's affairs. The United States will thus continue to act somewhat erratically within bounds determined by a broad consensus on basic economic and strategic interests -- which do not in themselves dictate any fundamental conflict with China.

The Chinese system, with its narrow leadership base and lack of regular mechanisms for turnover of power, gives an illusion of a steady hand on policy. But it is even more vulnerable to ethnocentric capture than its Japanese counterpart of the 1920s. Even if this takes place, even if it occurring right now, it need not have effects as terrible as those of World War II, but it would run a very uncomfortably great danger of doing so. The seeming prospect that China is contemplating its own replay of the Tsinan (Jinan) Incident over the Senkakus is anything but reassuring.

Some have objected that no military conflict could eventuate because of the threat of nuclear weapons, but these are not the words of anyone who knows or reflects on history. Ever since humankind has been fighting wars, for at least 100,000 years and very probably longer, unlimited conflicts have always threatened and frequently enough resulted in the destruction of both of the combatant societies. History says very clearly that such a threat may dampen the risks of war but cannot eliminate them. Indeed, the very fact that it is apologists for China (which by any rational calculation would inevitably suffer far more severely in any nuclear exchange) who invariably raise the nuclear specter speaks eloquently of the limited (albeit very great) power of the threat of annihilation.

Sunday, January 8, 2012

Politics & Music in Pakistan

Several years after "Yeh Hum Naheen," a bold attempt by Pakistani musicians to oppose terrorism (see below), the country's musical community seems to be losing hope, the AFP reports.

Friday, December 2, 2011

New Definitions for Information Operations

Ever since I began studying information operations (IO) five years ago, I have been frustrated with the definitions. Too many are bureaucratic non-definitions, often circular in nature. "The Office of Special Studies conducts studies that are special." What is 'special'? "Special refers to studies, particularly those carried out by the Office of Special Studies." You get the idea.

Perhaps most frustrating is the fact that the five "core capabilities" of Information Operations overlap terribly. Nor are they all really capabilities. Electronic warfare (EW) pertains to the physical waves of radios, radar, etc; it is a medium (or, to be more specific, operations in a given medium). Likewise, computer network operations (CNO) pertains to a medium. But military deception (MILDEC) and operational security (OPSEC) are both activities , which can be carried out in a varied of media. Psychological operations (PSYOP) are defined as operations by the military to convey information to a foreign audience to influence it. Again, that is an activity, and arguably one that encompasses MILDEC. Thus, if one hacks into an enemy computer to plant bogus information which will deceive him, one is engaging in CNO, MILDEC and PSYOP all at once.

It may be time to return to the drawing board. What, at the most fundamental level, is IO? Let me propose that its primary realm is the mind of the enemy. This makes it distinct from intelligence which, most fundamentally, pertains to our own mind and what we know (and adding to that body of knowledge).

There are really only two things we can do to the enemy's mind: we can convey information to it, or we can withhold information from it. We may be trying to make him feel fearful, over-confident or ignorant; we may be trying to make him attack the wrong location or hold back from attacking all together. But IO contains only two fundamental activities for accomplishing all those missions and more: we can convey information or withhold it.

Withholding information is conceptually simpler, so we will deal with it first. There are two basic means of withholding information: (1) preventing the enemy's eyes and ears from collecting it and (2) preventing its effective communication to headquarters.

Preventing collection can be either passive or active. Passive collection prevention means employing security, that is, metaphorically (or sometimes literally) building fences. Security includes computer firewalls (part of computer network defense, or CND), background checks, ID cards and a host of other measures designed to prevent the enemy from getting close to information he might like to obtain. Active collection prevention involves targeting enemy attempts to collect information. This can include physical destruction of enemy satellites or reconnaissance craft, but it can also include the capture or turning of enemy agents, which is the realm of counterintelligence (CI). CI often makes use of knowledge about the enemy - intelligence - to improve its collection prevention capabilities; if you know the enemy spy is coming, it is much easier to arrest him.

Preventing enemy communication can take a variety of forms: physical destruction of communications infrastructure, jamming of enemy signals (EW), or destroying enemy computer networks with viruses (a form of computer network attack - CNA).

While there are many forms of withholding information, this activity is relatively straight-forward. More complex is conveying information to the enemy. One of the reasons for this is that while the enemy's ignorance is almost always an obvious good for us, his possession of information - be it true or false - requires a more complex plan. Moreover, IO can also target third parties that are not necessarily enemies, including neutral nations or populations under enemy governments.

There are two ways of dividing means by which information is conveyed to the enemy. The first schema for thinking about this involves the true/false/partly true division. (This should not be confused with white, black and grey propaganda, terms which refer to the stated source of propaganda, rather than its contents.) Any body involved in conveying information may convey truthful messages; on the other hand, certain organizations - such as the Peace Corps and Voice of America - do not knowingly convey falsehood, since doing so would undermine their basic mission. While outright deception certainly has its utility, half-truths are often more useful, and must always be used to support deception.

The other method of dividing means of information conveyance is by medium. To some extent these media correspond to the IO "core capabilities".  Electromagnetic waves are clearly the realm of EW, while the bits and bytes of computer information belong to CNO.  Physical observation of troop movements may be prevented by OPSEC, or exploited by MILDEC.  Words and images (carried via leaflets or broadcasts) may be conveyed by PSYOP as well as non-IO entities.  Although such functions as White House press conferences are not primarily concerned with IO,  they should be planned in coordination with a larger IO strategy to ensure consistency.

At the very top of this hierarchy of definitions lies a question about which we have said relatively little: What do we want the enemy to do? That is why IO tries to get inside the enemy's head in the first place. The answer to that question will vary from one situation to the next, but it is the essential question. Closely related to it is a second: What do we want the enemy to think? The answer to the first question may be that we want the enemy to attack a position which he cannot take, suffering major losses in the process. If that is what we want him to do, we will try to accomplish that end by making him think that our position is weaker than it is. Around this we build an IO strategy, both denying and conveying information. We capture his spies and jam his radar so he cannot see the true strength of our position. We also release some true information about the presence of certain commanders elsewhere, suggesting that the units they command are not located at the position in question. Moreover, we also convey false information, suggesting that our forces are thin, perhaps because we believe the enemy will attack elsewhere.

These various categories and definitions are not perfect. Counterintelligence, for example, can gain useful information from turned enemy agents, and thus belongs to the field of intelligence as well as IO. Furthermore, CI can be used both to deny the enemy information as well as to convey information to him.

In spite of this and other shortcomings, I think this schema has much to offer. It provides a logical hierarchy of functions which allow for clear understanding of inter-locking roles. A tactical PSYOP unit may drop leaflets or conduct shows of military force, but both are methods of conveying information to the enemy, and both require some understanding of how the enemy processes information in order to craft effective messages. An emphasis on what IO does and how it does it, rather than how the Pentagon divides it into boxes, may allow for more flexible operations in the field and better outcomes for our IO commanders.

Pictured is an EC-130 Commondo Solo aircraft of the 193rd Special Operations Wing, used for propaganda broadcasts.  Picture via

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

US-Indian Relations in the Post-bin Laden World

This morning's FT reports that Osama bin Laden's neighbors in Abbottabad knew his house contained highly conservative residents, among them both Afghan refugees and Arabic-speakers. Moreover, locals knew that the house's residents bought food in large quantities at a time, had a taste for foreign beverages, burned all their trash and refused to allow their servants to hold second jobs with other employers. How did this not raise red flags? One neighbor, Jehangir Khan, reports that security in the area is heavy: “People are frequently asked to produce their national identity cards.” The case that Pakistan's intelligence is incompetent or complicit grows ever stronger.

Meanwhile, the discovery of Osama bin Laden deep in Pakistan, far from the Afghan border, is likely not only to sour US-Pakistani relations, but also - by extension - to strengthen US-Indian relations. Relations between the world's two largest democracies, though sometimes rocky (as in the case of India's recent rejection of US fighter planes), have general been positive in themselves; complications have primarily arisen from US support to Pakistan. If (or when) that support tapers off, US relations with India will likely continue to improve.

So where might we expect, or hope, for future US-Indian cooperation? Four areas come to mind:

  • Anti-piracy operations. We have already seen the Indian Navy take strong actions against Somali pirates. Likewise, the Indian Navy is already active in the Strait of Malacca. The US takes keen interest in the freedom of the seas, particularly in these two regions. Look for growing collaboration between US and Indian forces here.

  • Burma. The US has long tried to isolate the Burmese military junta, but a shift in US strategy and signs of possible change in the regime mean we can expect greater engagement in the future. India, by virtue of its border with Burma, has historically taken a more pragmatic approach to the Burmese junta. As American and Indian views converge, expect greater diplomatic and development cooperation.

  • Terrorism. India's single greatest terrorist enemy is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), whose primary aim is to drive India out of Kashmir. While the US is more interested in al-Qaeda, particularly Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), LeT is connected to the international network of Islamic terrorists, and thus the US and India have a common interest in fighting these forces. That Pakistan's ISI has often been a link in this chain complicates US-Indian cooperation, but if American ties to Pakistan decline, the door is opened for greater counterterrorism coordination.

  • Africa. India has strong ties to Africa, particularly with such important nations as Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Given its historic participation in the Non-Aligned Movement, India enjoys a degree of trust on the African continent which is rarely afforded to the United States. India will be careful to safeguard that status, but the US would do well to support Indian efforts, as a means of aiding African development and as a counterweight to Chinese penetration of Africa. The US presence in UN peacekeeping operations is currently all but non-existent. With the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, however, expect US involvement in peacekeeping to rise somewhat in the coming years. Much of this will be in Africa, where India already participates in peacekeeping missions in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire.

Thursday, September 30, 2010

Leave Out the "China"

Those who have been following the news, not only in the last few weeks but for the last few years, know that Beijing has been doing a considerable amount of saber rattling at sea. In fact, China claims the entire South China Sea as sovereign territory. Well, I say we launch a simple campaign to resist Chinese encroachment on the international waters off her coast. Instead of calling them the "East China Sea" and the "South China Sea", why not simply the "East Sea" and "South Sea"? They don't belong to China, so why should we pretend they do? (Admittedly, there will be some confusion with the southern half of the Pacific Ocean, once known as the South Sea or Seas. But that's a bit of an archaic usage, so I think we can manage.)

Wednesday, July 21, 2010

Turkey's New Role in the World

An excellent article in today's FT raises a question which has been on the minds of many analysts of international affairs: Turkey's evolving role on the global stage.

The basic conundrum is this: is Turkey's growing confidence and departure from the American playbook a good thing or a bad thing? I submit that, by and large, it is a good thing.

I am indebted to George Kennan for pointing out that the US does not need to conquer the world; we simply need to prevent the bad guys from doing so. Thus, he argued that multiple centers of power were perfectly acceptable, so long as no more than one was Soviet. Indeed, encouraging other centers of power could be a good thing, diluting the Soviet share of the total.

Today the Soviets are no longer with us, thankfully, but threats remain from China, Russia and Islamist terrorism. Turkey can serve as a rival to all three. Thus, while I would like to see Turkey maintain good relations with the US, Greece and Israel, I welcome Turkish involvement in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucus region and Central Asia as well. There will be times Turkey departs from stated American policies; there will be times we step on each other's toes. But we should weigh these costs against the benefits that Turkey brings. How else, for example, could we end up with a secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference coming from a NATO member?