The Boston Tea Party: A Model of Political Warfare (Part III)

(Click here for Part I)

Even a well-planned operation can backfire; the leaders of the Boston Tea Party were careful to avoid these. If someone within the political warfare campaign is diluting or contradicting the desired message, that person needs to be brought into line or otherwise neutralized before they do serious harm. In the case of the Tea Party, those who tried to save some of the tea for themselves were stripped naked, coated in mud and given a severe bruising.

Likewise, any political warfare should be carefully calibrated to send the desired message while avoiding collateral damage, be it metaphorical or – in the case of the Boston Tea Party – literal. Such unintended consequences can provide the opposition with ammunition. By making sure that nothing aside from the tea and tea chests were damaged, the Bostonians limited the possible negative side effects of their actions.

Poor operational security can also plague an otherwise well-planned campaign. Secrets – be they the identities of certain people, future plans or other matters – must be carefully maintained; leaks can make for terribly unpleasant surprises. One of the participants in the Boston Tea Party explained that afterwards they “quietly retired to our several places of residence, without having any conversation with each other, or taking any measures to discover who were our associates.”

Any time an action is nominally undertaken by a third party, the political warrior must be careful to make the denial of his involvement sufficiently plausible. While covering up proof of that involvement – the negative approach – is helpful, actively creating alibis – the positive approach – is likely to be even more successful. Samuel Adams and those involved in addressing the pre-Tea Party meeting made a point of remaining conspicuously behind in the Old South Meeting House. It was not a perfect alibi, but in the case of legal or other such action against them, it could have formed the first line of defense. Which may explain part of the reason that the governor never bothered to bring such charges.

Samuel Adams prepared an account of events the day after the Tea Party and Paul Revere (pictured above) immediately rode south with the news. A great speech or daring maneuver that gets no press coverage is of very limited value to the political warrior. Rather than simply hoping the media will pick up a story, or even encouraging it to do so, the story should be actively cultivated and disseminated. Controlling the message in this way ensures that the proper conclusions will be drawn.

The Boston Tea Party: A Model of Political Warfare (Part II)

(Click here for Part I)

A good political warfare campaign is not carried out in isolation, but in the context of a broader effort. An obvious element of such an effort is the utilization of political leverage in the traditional ways: passing resolutions, winning elections, etc. Even if victories in this area are not immediately attainable or are of little obvious effect, used in conjunction with other tools, political leveraging can highlight an issue and put pressure on certain parties. In the case of the Tea Party, the Boston Town Meeting and other political fora were utilized to demand the tea consignees' resignations.

This would be an example of propaganda of the deed. Other forms of propaganda are just as essential: a media blitz before the centerpiece of a campaign can focus attention and positively incline the public to receive the desired message. Sam Adams and his committee of correspondence were masters of cranking out letter, articles and speeches.

Finally, potential problems should be identified and neutralized before a major effort is undertaken. When Governor Hutchison of Massachusetts ordered the colonel of the cadet corps, a certain John Hancock, to prepare for action, Hancock refused. The British still had soldiers at their command, of course, but Hancock's action limited Hutchison's options and reduced the danger to the patriot cause.

Which leads us to one of the great lessons of political warfare: create uncomfortable dilemmas for the enemy. Like a good move in chess, this bit of political warfare leaves the opposition with options all of which play into the political warrior’s hands. The day before the tea was scheduled to be landed in Boston, the Dartmouth’s owner rode through the rain and cold to obtain permission from the governor not to land; Hutchison could either concede or look like a jerk. (In the event, he chose the latter, which did nothing to help his plunging popularity with the people of Boston.) The very Tea Party itself created a similar dilemma: the British could escalate or back down, but either way, they played into the patriots’ hands.

(Click here for Part III)

The Boston Tea Party: A Model of Political Warfare (Part I)

Any political warfare campaign – be it an attempt to remove a member of the local school board or an effort to foment rebellion in a foreign country – requires a variety of people, all of which the Boston Tea Party had, in its own way. Leaders from the political classes provide access to and familiarity with the traditional levers of political power; even if these cannot be fully utilized, political leadership may at least be able to neutralize them. In the case of the Tea Party, this leadership came from the North End Caucus, a sort of local political club.

Most acts of political warfare require that someone actually do something, be it knocking on doors and promoting a candidate or throwing tea off a ship; these sorts of things can require large numbers of people, often people with skills or experiences differing from those of the political leadership. Tying together the Boston longshoremen and the North End Caucus were middle class Bostonians who had social and familial ties to the world of the wharf. These men were networkers – people with a variety of connections who are able to speak to different audiences – and every political warfare campaign needs them to hold together various elements.

Whatever strata of society they come from or whatever role they play in the campaign, those with something to lose are obvious participants; they have a real stake in the outcome. For the Boston Tea Party it was the "smuggling fraternity" that had such stake and they proved willing cooperators with Samuel Adams (pictured above) and the other patriot leaders.

Finally, allies outside the immediate area of concern can be very helpful, providing moral or material support in times of difficulty; in addition, gathering allies before the opposition does prevents him from gaining any advantage by widening the conflict. Boston's Committee of Correspondence was instrumental in keeping the merchants of Philadelphia and New York in touch with and supportive of the patriot cause.

(Click here for Part II)